Missile defense and Moore's Law: when, not if

Back when Reagan was pushing his so-called "Star Wars" program, it seemed to many that it would be as ineffective as it would be expensive -- and potentially destabilizing to boot.

Fast-forward a few decades, and the picture looks rather different (though if this thread over at the Volokh Conspiracy is any indication, there is still considerable skepticism). According to what information has been released to the public, the current generation of interceptors still have a miserably low success rate even under optimal conditions. Yet leaving aside the point that even this may be enough to provide an effective deterrent to rogue nation brinksmanship, it should be emphasized that what is lacking isn't the interceptor technology per se, but rather more specifically, interceptor guidance.

Put another way, interceptors we already have -- what we need now is better aim. And what constrains better aim? Listening to the skeptics, you might think it would be some immutable physical constant. In fact, the main limitation is computing power. I don't know if Reagan or his advisors were so prescient as to appreciate the implications of Moore's Law for missile defense back in the '80s, but it shouldn't be so hard to extrapolate now, two decades later.

If computational power doubles every 18 months, so should antimissile targeting accuracy. Exponential increase has a way of sneaking up on you. I don't know enough to say when the scoffing will stop, but it seems certain that that stop will be abrupt -- just as it was for "smart bombs", whose potential should have been obvious long prior to their appearance in perfected form in Afghanistan.

MORE on current antimissile developments here.

Posted by David on June 21, 2006 9:05 AM